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I. INTRODUCTION
Drug trafficking in Latin America generates $500 billion a year,
which exceeds the region's foreign debt.' Money laundering plays a
key role in maintaining a lucrative global illicit drug trade.2 The
United Nations has estimated that money launderers worldwide are
processing $120-500 billion each year? Drug traffickers currently
launder their profits in banking systems on all continents and in as
many as fifty countries.4 The Western Hemisphere is home to some of
the most well-known money laundering havens, some of the primary
producers of illegal drugs, and the biggest consumer of illicit drugs,
the United States.5 Despite these serious problems, many countries in
the Western Hemisphere lack a comprehensive legal framework that
criminalizes certain aspects of money laundering.6
In the war against the international drug trade, governments have
enjoyed the least success in the area of money laundering.7 "[L]egal
complications, lack of international co-operation, technical difficulties
in tracking financial transactions and [a] shortage of personnel" are
among the obstacles hindering governments' efforts.8 The ability to
launder proceeds from the illegal trade in narcotics enables drug traf-
fickers to purchase sophisticated equipment such as long-range air-
craft and high-powered boats, and to have huge pools of funds
available with which to bribe the police, the judiciary, and government
officials in the countries where traffickers operate.9
International efforts to control money laundering will fail without
the participation of nations in the Western Hemisphere and the Or-
ganization of American States (OAS). 10 Drug traffickers will con-
1. OAS Nations Urged to Ban Money Laundering, MIAM HERALD, June 9, 1991, at
13A.
2. See Scott E. Mortman, Note, Putting Starch in European Efforts to Combat Money
Laundering, 60 FoRi-L&i~ L. REv. 429 (1992).
3. Konstantin D. Magliveras, Defeating the Money Launderer-The International and
European Framework, J. Bus. L., Mar. 1992, at 161.
4. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, Narcotics-Related Money Laundering and Other Financial
Transactions, in INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS CONTROL STRATEGY REPORT (1991), avail-
able in LEXIS, Nsamer Library, Samer File.
5. OAS Unit Proposes Money Laundering, Forfeiture Laws, MONEY LAUNDERING
ALERT, Apr. 1991, at 1, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, MLA File.
6. OAS Tries to Curb Money Laundering, L.A. TIMES, May 25, 1992, at D2.
7. Robert Graham, Clean Hands Speed Dirty Money, FIN. TIMES, Oct. 12, 1988, at 8,
8. Id.
9. Magliveras, supra note 3, at 161.
10. OAS Unit Proposes Money Laundering, Forfeiture Laws, supra note 5; see alse
Trying to Catch Up with Global Markets, FIN. TihMs, May 1991, available in LEXIS, Worh
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tinue to hide the illegal origins of their money so long as offshore
banking havens exist." Moreover, new laws restricting bank secrecy
and requiring recording of banking transactions are causing money
laundering operations to shift from countries with traditional safe ha-
ven banking systems to countries with less stringent banking laws.12
Much of the legal analysis regarding international efforts to con-
trol money laundering has focused on European initiatives to prevent
the exploitation of the Common Market.13 The elimination of finan-
cial restrictions among European Community (EC) members in order
to establish a unified economy has exposed the potential vulnerability
of European financial institutions to money launderers. 4 Important
efforts to combat money laundering, however, are underway outside
of Europe. The Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission's
Model Regulations Concerning Laundering Offenses Connected to Il-
licit Drug Trafficking and Related Offenses'- (Model Regulations)
represent "one [of] the major multilateral money laundering control
undertakings. [They] will impact on some of the world's most notori-
ous money laundering centers, such as certain Caribbean nations,
Uruguay and Panama, as well as on the U.S. which produces [such] a
large portion of illicit drug dollars."' 6
This Note examines current efforts to fight money laundering in
the Western Hemisphere through the establishment of a system of
uniform laws based on the Model Regulations. Part II provides gen-
eral definitions and descriptions of money laundering transactions and
Library, F'mtim File. See part IV of this Note for information on the Organization of
American States.
11. Bernd Debusmann, U.S. Wins Battles But No Victory on Dng Finances, RuTE P-,
Aug. 31, 1989, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Reuter File.
12. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, supra note 4. Venezuela is replacing more traditional
money laundering centers such as Colombia, the Cayman Islands, and Panama. Ne.v
Money Laundering Plaguing Venezuela, INT'L MARKET ALERT, Apr. 23, 1993, avadable in
LEXIS, World Library, Allwld File.
13. See e.g., Mortman, supra note 2; Magliveras, supra note 3.
14. See Mortman, supra note 2; Magliveras, supra note 3, at 169.
15. Model Regulations Concerning Laundering Offenses Connected to Ilhcit Dru:g Traf-
fticking and Related Offenses, OAS/Ler.L/X1V.2 CICADIINF.5Sf92 (July 9, 1992) [hereinaf-
ter Model Regulations]. The Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission (CICAD)
is "an autonomous regional organization within the Organization of American State3" and
was established pursuant to an OAS conference on drug trafficking held in April 19,36.
Bruce Zagaris & Elizabeth Kingma, Asset Forfeiture International and Foreign Law. An
Emerging Regime, 5 EMORY INTL' L. REv. 445, 476 & n.117 (1991).
16. OAS Nears Final Draft of Model Laundering Laws for Western Hemisphere,
MONEY LAuNDERING ALERT, Jan. 1992, at 7, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, MLA
File.
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addresses the need for a coordinated effort to fight money laundering
in the Western Hemisphere. Part III reviews the existing international
schemes to prevent money laundering. Part IV analyzes the OAS
Model Regulations. This Note concludes that the Model Regulations,
if enacted by OAS member states through appropriate legislation,
should reduce the level of money laundering in the Western Hemi-
sphere. Finally, this Note makes recommendations for modifications
and enhancements to the Model Regulations so that the system will be
better able to achieve the OAS objective of halting money laundering
in the Western Hemisphere.
H. THE GLOBAL DRUG TRAFFICKING PROBLEM
A. What Is Money Laundering?
Money laundering is the process of transferring the proceeds
from criminal activities "into legitimate tax-free capital" by disguising
"the source of the illegal proceeds as well as the nature of the gained
wealth."'17 The Inter-American Commission for the Control of Drug
Abuse (CICAD), the author of the Model Regulations, has more nar-
rowly defined money laundering as the transfer of proceeds from "the
trafficking of narcotics or related offenses."'
While money launderers use various, constantly changing meth-
ods to disguise the illegal source of funds, a typical transaction could
be a variation on the arrangement that follows: A trafficker organizes
a business, such as a restaurant, in his own name. He then contacts an
attorney in an offshore haven, for example Panama, to form a finance
company. The trafficker's name is not associated with the Panama-
nian company, which is administered by a Panamanian. The finance
company's account is filled with cash that is hand-carried from the
United States and earned by the sale of illegal drugs. The restaurant
takes out a loan from the Panamanian company. The finance com-
pany wires the loan proceeds into the restaurant's U.S. account, trans-
forming the "dirty cash into a legitimate payment."'19
In an infamous case involving the Bank of Credit and Commerce
International (BCCI), money launderers used a more complex
17. 1 FLETCHER N. BALDWIN, JR. & ROBERT J. MUNRO, MONEY LAUNDERING, ASSET
FORFEITURE AND INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL CRIMES, General Introduction 3 (1993).
18. Drugs: OAS Proposes Waiver of Banking Secrecy, INTER PRESS SERVICE, May 23,
1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Inpres File.
19. Debusmann, supra note 11 (providing a detailed description of the above
transaction).
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scheme. The launderers deposited drug money into non-BCCI banks
in the United States. They then wired the money to an account at
BCCI in Tampa, Florida, which they had opened specifically to laun-
der money. The launderers then transferred the money by wire
through a non-BCCI New York bank to BCCI headquarters in Lux-
embourg. They then wired the money to BCCI in London, w, ith in-
structions to place it in a certificate of deposit. The launderers used
this certificate as security for a loan in the Bahamas to a front corpo-
ration set up by the narcotics dealers. Next, they wired the loan pro-
ceeds back into the undercover account in Tampa, after which they
transferred it to BCCI in Uruguay. Finally, from Uruguay, the laun-
derers transferred the funds into cash in Colombia,' 0 where the nar-
cotics dealers could access the "clean money."
B. "Smurfing":" An Army of Money Launderers
The success of a money laundering system often depends upon
"smurfing," the movement of cash in small amounts to circumvent
mandatory reporting requirements imposed by the United States. 1
Smurfs, who are "low-level members of the trafficking organization,"
take money from drug sales and buy thousands of traveler's checks or
money orders, which they deposit into dozens of bank accounts. In
this way, narcotics dealers avoid the financial institutions' mandatory
reporting to the federal government of transactions of $10,000 or
more."
20. Daniel M. Laifer, Note, Putting the Super in Back in the Supervision of Interna-
tional Banking, Post-BCCI, 60 FoRDHANi L RE%,. 467, 484 (1992) (providing a detailed
explanation of the BCCI scheme).
21. See Colombian Drug Traffickers Active in Venezuela, NoTISuR-S. A.i. AND CAn.
IBBEAN POLT A.., Feb. 26, 1992, available in LEXIS, World Library, NotSur File. See
infra notes 23 and 69 and accompanying text (discussing U.S. reporting requirements).
22. Colombian Drug Traffickers Active in Venezuela, supra note 21; see also Graham,
supra note 7.
23. Under the 1986 Money Laundering Act, banks must report transactions of S10,',3
or more and suspicious transactions of less than that amount. Money Laundering Control
Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207-18 (codified as amended in scattered see-
tions of 12, 18, and 31 U.S.C.); 31 U.S.C. § 5313 (19SS); 31 C.F.R. § 103.23(a)-(c) (1993);
Bank Employee Becomes Drug Sleuth, U.S. BANKER, Nov. 19S9, at 28, available in LEXIS,
Banking Library, Uspub File. Smurfing, according to Venezuelan law enforcement offi-
cials, is used to launder millions of dollars from drug sales in the United States. Once the
funds have been dispersed through relatively small deposits into various bank accounts, the
money is transferred back to traffickers in Colombia or Venezuela. Colombian Drug Traf-
fickers Active in Venezuela, supra note 21.
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C. Money Laundering Magnets
Countries act as magnets for illegally derived profits if they have
strict bank client anonymity laws and are uncooperative when law en-
forcement organizations request information regarding suspicious ac-
count activity.24 One author has described the problem as a kind of
vicious circle:
Stringent bank secrecy laws of the kind that exist in Luxembourg or
the Cayman Islands create gaps for review and thus facilitate crimi-
nal activity. The problem becomes circular: a banking center's will-
ingness to enact secrecy laws attracts criminal activities, and then
the country argues that it could not provide adequate supervision of
those activities because of secrecy laws.
25
While sources often differ concerning which areas of the world
serve as key money laundering centers, the U.S. Department of State
has identified a number of OAS member states, namely Bolivia, Bra-
zil, Canada, the Cayman Islands, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, Pan-
ama, Paraguay, Uruguay, the United States, and Venezuela as major
laundering magnets.26 Venezuela recently has emerged as the new
Latin American money laundering capital.27
Naturally, much attention has focused on Colombia, which some
consider a "narcotocracy. '' 28 Major Colombian banks have been im-
plicated in ambitious laundering schemes or are currently under scru-
tiny by the United States.2 9 By some accounts, Colombia itself "is
controlled by a handful of narcotics barons" who influence legislation,
terrorize the judiciary, and pay off government officials. 30 Despite the
24. Global Money Laundering Rules Seen Needed to Reduce Drug Profit Flows, BNA
INT'L FIN. DAILY, Mar. 28, 1991, available in LEXIS, World Library, Bnabnk File (citing
Alison Jamieson, author of Global Drug Trafficking, a report published by the Research
Institute for the Study of Conflict and Terrorism).
25. Laifer, supra note 20, at 483. Bank secrecy refers to the requirement that financial
institutions keep client information received in the course of business confidential. Thus,
secrecy laws "protect private interests in bank records." Charles Thelen Plombeck, Confi-
dentiality and Disclosure: The Money Laundering Control Act of 1986 and Banking Se.
crecy, 22 INT'L LAw. 69, 89 n.143 (1988). For a country-by-country examination of bank
secrecy, see DENNIS CAMPBELL, INTERNATIONAL BANK SECRECY (1992).
26. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS CONTROL STRATEGY REPORT
62, 503 (1993) [hereinafter STRATEGY REPORT].
27. Victoria Colliver, Venezuelan Law Aims to Dent Drug Business, CHRISTIAN SCI,
MONITOR, Aug. 20, 1993, at 2.
28. Colombia Struggles to Deflect Label of "Narcotocracy," MONEY LAUNDERING
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existence of money laundering havens throughout the Americas and
the Caribbean, there is no international legal framework to combat
such illicit activity and undermine the success of drug traffickers in the
Western Hemisphere. l
D. The Importance of Halting Money Laundering
1. Economic and Social Effects of Drug Trafficking
Illicit drug money probably does not result in a net positive effect
on economies and societies. Money laundering fuels inflation and
raises the cost of living and housing.32 Despite the appearance of for-
eign car dealerships, art galleries, and construction booms in Colom-
bian cities, most Colombian economists doubt that illicit cocaine
profits have an overall positive effect on the country's economy.2
3
According to Adolfo Barajas, a Bogota economist, although the drug
boom may have provided Colombia with some relief in the 19SOs
when Latin American economies were contracting, "the drug econ-
omy doesn't have many positive linkages to the general economy. It
doesn't employ a lot of people; it's unstable; and you can't devote
resources to it, because the state is trying to destroy it."'
A study by a Bogota economic research group, Fedesarrollo, re-
vealed that the enormous illicit drug trade has actually "disindustrial-
ized" Colombia's economy by forcing local manufacturers out of their
legitimate businesses3 ' Traffickers chose contraband clothing as the
vehicle for repatriating their profits. The contraband clothing com-
peted with locally produced textiles for the Colombian market and
deprived the government of import revenues that were collected on
legitimate imports.36 Additional effects of this process of "disindustri-
alization" include injuries to cotton growers and businesses that pro-
vide fertilizer and transportation to the textile industry.37
Finally, the drug barons' ability to launder their illicit profits-
allowing them to repatriate their earnings to Colombia-disrupts the
31. Bruce Zagaris & Constantine Papavizas, Using the Organization of American
States to Control International Narcotics Trafficking and Money Laundering, 57 RElvvE
INTERNATIONALE DE DRorr PENAL 119, 120 (19S6).
32. Latin America: War on Drugs is Being Lost, Bishops Warn, I.r-TER PaTss SERVICZ,
Sept. 9, 1993, available in LEXIS, World Library, Allwld File.
33. Amelia Obregon, Cocaine Rides No Help to Colombia, S.F. CHRON., NoV. 17,
1992, at Al, A13.
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local economy because drug barons can spend local currency on im-
ported luxury goods for their own consumption. 8 This appetite for
imported goods produces no positive effect for the Colombian
economy.
3 9
The drug trade also has serious social consequences, even in
countries like Peru and Bolivia,40 where thousands of peasants are in-
volved in the labor-intensive cultivation of coca plants.
41 The effect of
the drug trade extends beyond the economy. Drug money seriously
affects society, particularly youths, who romanticize the high-profile
lifestyles of drug traffickers.42 Furthermore, the enormous funds at
the disposal of the traffickers allow traffickers to corrupt the police,
judiciary, and other government officials, thereby destroying the so-
cial and governmental structure of society.
43
2. Clean Hands Wash Dirty Money
A South American drug baron maxim, "dirty money is best
passed through clean hands," 44 illustrates the principle that using a
legitimate financial institution is the best way to disguise the illegal
source of funds.45 It is appropriate to target money laundering opera-
tions as part of a strategy to halt the international drug trade because
a large proportion of monies laundered comes from illegal narcotics
trade.46 Producers could not take advantage of the profits from sell-
ing their drugs without the ability to repatriate their profits or control
them offshore.47 Money laundering is thus a key area in the war
against drugs.48
38. Id. More stringent U.S. banking law enforcement, in combination with other fac-
tors, has increased the amount of cash Colombian drug cartels repatriate annually from
10% to 20% of their profits from U.S. cocaine sales, to 50% of their profits. Douglas Farah
& Steve Coil, Cocaine Dollars Flow Via Unique Network; Colombian Brokers Bid to Ship
Cash, WASH. PosT, Sept. 19, 1993, at Al.
39. Obregon, supra note 33, at A13.
40. STRATEGY REPORT, supra note 26, at 4.
41. Obregon, supra note 33, at A13.
42. Id.
43. Magliveras, supra note 3, at 161.
44. Graham, supra note 7.
45. Id.
46. Magliveras, supra note 3, at 161.
47. See U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, supra note 4.
48. See Magliveras, supra note 3, at 161.
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E. Inability of Individual Countries To Stop the Illegal Drug
Trade
"No single country can control the illegal drug trade."4 9 Typical
illicit drug transactions involve several countries: "a source country,
intermediate pass-through countries, a country of destination, and a
country or countries where the funds are laundered."" The tighten-
ing of money laundering laws in certain countries has stimulated in-
creasingly sophisticated money laundering practices, deposits of less
than $10,000 (smurfing) to avoid mandatory reporting requirements,
frequent use of offshore centers where money laundering is not a
crime, and attempts to find unethical employees in the banking
system.51
Despite the growth of international banking, supervision of bank-
ing practices has not become increasingly international. 2  Bilateral
cooperation agreements or single-country efforts are insufficient to
stop the money laundering process. Sophisticated launderers will
avoid detection, so long as there is a jurisdiction that remains outside
the cooperative scheme. 3
I. SIGNflICANT INTERNATIONAL EFFORTS TO
HALT MONEY LAUNDERINGf 4
A. The Vienna Convention
The United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotics
Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (Vienna Convention or Conven-
tion) has provided the groundwork for further international agree-
ments in the area of drug trafficking and money launderingPs Forty-
four states signed the Convention in Vienna, Austria on December 19,
49. Zagaris & Papavizas, supra note 31, at 119; see also Interpol Admits Defeat in
"Drug War",- Police Overwhelmed by the Cartel's Superior Resources, LAxr. A!.M. WVKLY.
REP., June 17, 1993, at 269, available in LEXIS, World Library, Allld File (citing a Guate-
malan anti-drug official).
50. Zagaris & Papavizas, supra note 31, at 119.
51. Graham, supra note 7.
52: Laifer, supra note 20, at 467.
53. Trying to Catch Up with Global Markets, supra note 10.
54. The author has attempted to discuss just a few of the significant anti.money
laundering efforts that are underway. See BALDWiN & MUNRO, supra note 17, for an
excellent overview of the initiatives discussed in this Note, in addition to an overview of
the efforts of the Council of Europe, the Caribbean Drug Money Laundering Conference,
and the Financial Action Task Force.
55. United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psycho-
tropic Substances, Dec. 19, 198S, 28 LL.M. 493 [hereinafter Vienna Convention].
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1988.56 As of April 1993, the number of states ratifying or acceding to
the Vienna Convention had increased to seventy-two. 7
The Convention became effective on November 11, 1990.11 Arti-
cle 3 sets forth drug-related offenses and requires each signatory na-
tion to criminalize such offenses. 59 Article 5 provides for the
confiscation of proceeds derived from any of the offenses established
in article 3, which include not only money laundering, but a range of
other drug-related offenses.60
B. Coordinated European Efforts
An EC Council Directive is one of the recent European initia-
tives to preclude the integrated European financial market from being
exploited by money launderers.61 The Directive focuses on two goals:
making money laundering a criminal offense in EC member states and
enhancing cooperation among the member states in investigations and
prosecutions.6' Essentially, the Directive requires that member states
criminalize money laundering and imposes duties on financial institu-
tions concerning customer identification and transaction records.6 3
The Council Directive required member states to adopt national legis-
lation to implement the provisions of the Directive by January 1,
1993.64
C. Kerry Agreements
In 1988, the U.S. Congress enacted the Kerry Amendment, which
required the Treasury Department to negotiate bilateral agreements
with countries suspected of laundering large sums of proceeds from
illicit drug sales in the United States.65 The Kerry Amendment acts as
a complement to the 1986 Money Laundering Control Act, which re-
56. Magliveras, supra note 3, at 162.
57. STRATEGY REPORT, supra note 26, at 4. See id. at 20-23 for a list of the countries
that signed, ratified, or acceded to the Vienna Convention.
58. Magliveras, supra note 3, at 162 n.4.
59. Vienna Convention, supra note 55, art. 3.
60. Id. arts. 3, 5.
61. See Council Directive 91/308, 1991 O.J. (L 166) 777.
62. Mortman, supra note 2, at 431.
63. Id. at 431-33.
64. Id. at 435.
65. Kerry Amendment, Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, 31 U.S.C. § 5311 (1988), re-
pealed by Pub. L. No. 102-583, § 6(e)(i), 106 Stat. 4933 (1992); State Department to Moni-
tor World Money Laundering, MONEY LAUNDERING ALERT, Oct. 1992, at 7, available in
LEXIS, Nexis Library, MLA File.
[Vol. 17:433
Are Money Launderers All Washed Up?
quires bank reporting of suspicious transactions.-6 The first Kerry
Agreement, between the United States and Venezuela, focused on the
exchange of bank records documenting money laundering activities."
The ten articles of the Agreement establish a system for exchanging
currency transaction information regarding transfers of $10,000 or
more.6s Information that must be kept is similar to that which U.S.
banks keep under the Bank Secrecy Act.69 To date, there are six sepa-
rate Kerry Agreements with Colombia, Ecuador, Panama, Peru, Uru-
guay, and Venezuela, which the United States considers some of the
most prominent laundering centers.70 The Kerry Amendment expired
in 1990, and Congress assigned responsibility for foreign negotiations
to the State Department 7 Pursuant to an amendment to the Foreign
Assistance Act of 1961, the President must submit an annual report to
Congress that addresses major money laundering centers, specifies
which countries have not yet entered into bilateral agreements, and
identifies which countries have signed the Vienna Convention or the
OAS Model Regulations. 7
The Kerry Agreements, however, suffer from inherent limita-
tions. The most obvious limitation is their narrow focus on the ex-
change of information. Under the Kerry Agreements, money
laundering remains legal in the signatory countries if such countries'
laws permit it.73 Additionally, countries retain discretion to deny re-
quests for assistance under certain circumstances. Under the Vene-
zuelan agreement, for example, either Venezuela or the United States
may deny a request for assistance if it is "likely to prejudice the secur-
ity, public policy or other essential interests of the requested party.- 74
Further limiting the scope of the Venezuela-U.S. agreement is a provi-
sion that either party has the right to terminate the agreement upon
66. Money Laundering Control Act of 1986, Pub.L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3217-18 to
3207-39 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12, 18, and 31 U.S.C.); 31 U S.C.
§ 5313 (198S); Debusmann, supra note 11.
67. Venezuela Pact Allows Broad Access to Bank Records; First Bilateral Kerry Agrcc-
ment May Serve as Model for Other Accords, MomNy LAUNDERING, ALERT, Dec. 1 99, at
7, available in LEXS, Nexis Library, MLA file.
68. Id.
69. Id.; Colombia Struggles to Deflect Label of "Narcoocracy." supra note 2'; see 31
U.S.C. § 5313; 31 C.F.R. § 103.23(a)-(c) (requiring U.S. banks to report trans2ctions in-
volving $10,000 or more).
70. State Department to Monitor World Money Laundering, supra note 05.
71. 22 U.S.C. § 2291h (1993).
72. 22 U.S.C. § 2291h(a).
73. See Colombian Drug Traffickers Active in Venezuela, supra note 21.
74. Venezuela Pact Allows Broad Access to Bank Records, supra note 67, at 7.
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ninety days written notice.7' More generally, countries also resist such
agreements because the agreements arguably infringe upon a coun-
try's national sovereignty.76 These limitations and the need to negoti-
ate each agreement separately prevent the Kerry Agreements from
making more than a limited contribution to the fight against money
laundering.
IV. THE ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES
AND THE MODEL REGULATIONS
A. The OAS and CICAD
The OAS Charter was signed in Bogota in 1948.77 Today, OAS
membership includes almost every country in the Western Hemi-
sphere.78 The aims of the OAS include, inter alia, solving common
legal problems,79 like prevention of money laundering through a uni-
form statutory framework.
CICAD is an "autonomous regional organization" within the
OAS.8" CICAD's work, including the Model Regulations, is not bind-
ing on the member states, as it is considered "soft law."'81 Soft law
refers to intergovernmental organization resolutions and recommen-
dations that are not binding on member states.82 "Hard law," by con-
trast, refers to binding obligations developed by intergovernmental
75. Id.
76. Debusmann, supra note 11.
77. Charter of the Organization of American States, T.I.A.S. No. 2361 (entered into
force Dec. 13, 1951); Zagaris & Papavizas, supra note 31, at 120. The OAS currently has 35
members: Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, the Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Bolivia, Bra-
zil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba (participation suspended), Dominica, the
Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Grenada, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Hondu-
ras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, St.
Vincent and the Grenadines, Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago, the United States, Uruguay,
and Venezuela. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, Fact Sheet: Who Belongs to What, DEP'T OF STATE
DISPATCH, VOL. 4 No. 8 (Feb. 22, 1993), available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Dstate File.
78. Zagaris & Papavizas, supra note 31, at 120.
79. Id.
80. Zagaris & Kingma, supra note 15, at 476. The OAS established CICAD as a result
of an OAS conference on drug traffic held in Rio de Janeiro on April 22-26, 1986. Id. at
476 n.117 (citing Organization of American States, Inter-American Program of Action of
Rio de Janeiro Against the Illicit Use and Production of Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic
Substances and Traffic Therein, ch. IV, § 1(a), OAS Doc. No. OEA/Ser. K/XXXI.1, CI-
CAD/1986). The OAS General Assembly established CICAD in November 1986. Id. (cit-
ing OAS G.A. Res. 813 (1986)).
81. See Zagaris & Kingma, supra note 15, at 452.
82. Id.
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organizations.' The Model Regulations thus serve as only a sug-
gested statutory framework, and the member states may make them
effective by enacting their own legislation that incorporates the Regu-
lations' provisions.
Although the Model Regulations are non-binding, they play an
important role in the establishment of an anti-money laundering re-
gime in the Western Hemisphere. It is likely that the member states
will enact legislation to prevent money laundering.' Furthermore,
CICAD's work particularly benefits OAS member states that do not
have legislative resources to devote to investigating and formulating
the desired anti-laundering legislation. Moreover, CICAD and the
OAS ascertained the state of existing law and practices relating to
money laundering before drafting the Model Regulations.? The
Model Regulations are, therefore, adapted to the member states'
needs and better tailored than legislation simply "borrowed" from an-
other country.
B. Origins of the Regulations
The process of formulating the Model Regulations began in 1990
when CICAD initiated a program under which the OAS would adopt
the Vienna Convention and serve as a consultant for interested gov-
ernmentsS6 Next, the OAS General Assembly issued the Declaration
and Program of Action of Lxtapa, which resulted from an extraordi-
nary session of the General Assembly in 1990.87 At the Ixtapa meet-
ing, the OAS declared "drug trafficking a crime against humanity"
and agreed to devote great attention to eliminating it.' Senior dele-
gates from thirty-two members of the OAS expressed their approval
of this goal by signing the Ixtapa agreement.89
After two years of work, the process of drafting a set of model
regulations neared conclusion on January 24, 1992, at a conference in
San Jose, Costa Rica.90 The drafters included experts from Argentina,
83. Id.
84. Id. at 452, 477.
85. Id. at 477.
86. Lyng-Hou Ramirez, Latin America: OAS Urged to Step up War on Dris. Irt'3.-
PREnss SERVICE, Oct. 25, 1990, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Inpres File.
87. Drugs: OAS Proposes Waiver of Banking Secrecy. supra note 18.
88. Id.
89. Multinational Drug Pact Signed in MeXico, Cm. TRB., Apr. 21, 1990. at Q6i
90. OAS Nears Final Draft of Model Laundering Laws for Western Hcrnisplwre, supra
note 16.
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the Bahamas, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Jamaica,
Mexico, Peru, Venezuela, the United States, and Uruguay.9'
The experts concluded their work in a final meeting at the elev-
enth regular session of the OAS in March 1992 in Punta del Este, Uru-
guay. 2  In attendance were representatives from Antigua and
Barbuda, Argentina, the Bahamas, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Colombia,
Costa Rica, Chile, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador,
Guatemala, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, the
United States, Uruguay, and Venezuela.9 3 The experts' efforts re-
sulted in nineteen anti-drug recommendations that were to be submit-
ted to the OAS for adoption.94 At the twenty-second general
assembly in the Bahamas, which ended on May 23, 1992, the General
Assembly of the OAS considered and adopted the experts' recom-
mendations,95 known as the Model Regulations Concerning Launder-
ing Offenses Connected to Illicit Drug Trafficking and Related
Offenses.
Although the General Assembly has adopted the Model Regula-
tions, each individual OAS member state may, but is not required to,
enact its own legislation in order to implement the provisions sug-
gested by the OAS.96 As of October 1993, no OAS member had en-
acted legislation based on the Model Regulations.97 To encourage
member states to enact such national legislation, the OAS is con-
ducting a series of regional conferences. Representatives from Argen-
tina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Paraguay, Peru, and Uruguay met in
December 1992 in Santiago, Chile. Conferences were held in Panama,
Mexico, and the Caribbean in 1993.9s
91. Group of Seven Nations Invite Nine More Countries, MONEY LAUNDERINo ALERT,
Dec. 1990, at 8, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, MLA File.
92. Carlos Diaz, OAS Committee Urges Uniform Drug Fight, UPI, Mar. 13,1992, avail-
able in LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI File.
93. Id
94. Id.
95. Drugs: OAS Proposes Waiver of Banking Secrecy, supra note 18.
96. See Zagaris & Kingma, supra note 15, at 452.
97. Telephone Interview with Ruth Connolly, Coordinator of the Inter-American
Drug Information System, citing Irving Tragen, Executive Secretary of the Inter-American
Drug Abuse Commission (Oct. 12, 1993). Several OAS member states, however, have
recently enacted anti-money laundering legislation that is not based on the Model Regula-
tions. The author recognizes the importance of such legislation, but a detailed discussion is
beyond the scope of this Note. For an overview of the new Venezuelan law, see Colliver,
supra note 27.
98. STRATEGY REPORT, supra note 26, at 498.
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C. The Principal Provisions of the Model Regulations
As OAS countries begin to enact relevant legislation, it is impor-
tant to remember that the Model Regulations are only a suggested
framework with inherent limitations and loopholes. The following
discussion will lay out the important provisions of the Model Regula-
tions. An examination of their limitations and flaws will follow.'
The Model Regulations derive their definition of money launder-
ing from the Vienna Convention, which focuses its definition solely on
the proceeds from illicit drug traffic, not from any other illegal activi-
ties.1°0 Adopting this meaning, the Model Regulations define "money
laundering as the transfer of proceeds from the trafficking of narcotics
or related offenses."''
Article 2 of the Model Regulations criminalizes money launder-
ing. A person who converts, transfers, acquires, possesses, or uses
property and, at a minimum, should have known that it proceeded
from illicit traffic or related offenses, may be convicted. 1c- A negli-
gent mental state is thus sufficient for this offense."0 3
Article 3 confers jurisdiction on OAS member states' courts for
money laundering offenses regardless of whether or not the drug traf-
ficking occurred in another jurisdiction.104 This grant of jurisdiction
does not interfere with extradition where applicable. 0 5
The rights of bona fide third parties find protection in the provi-
sions of article 6 .1°6 These protections also limit the application of
article 4 with respect to freezing or seizure orders,"07 and article 5,
which provides that a person convicted of illicit traffic or related of-
fenses shall forfeit property and proceeds related to the offense. 3
99. The prohibition of certain illicit activities and the active enforcement of anti-
money laundering laws will only address part of the problem associated vith drug traffick-
ing. Latin American governments have complained that the United States has taken inad-
equate measures to slow the demand for narcotics. Graham, supra note 7. Therefore, the
OAS Model Regulations should not be viewed as a panacea. They, like other legislation
directed at drug producers and traffickers, focus on the supply, rather than the demand
side of the drug problem.
100. Model Regulations art. 1; see supra notes 55-60 and accompanying text.
101. Drugs: OAS Proposes Waiver of Banking Secrecy, supra note 18; sce Model Regu-
lations arts. 1, 2.
102. Model Regulations art. 2, §§ 1, 2.
103. See id art. 2.
104. Id. art. 3.
105. Id.
106. Id. art. 6.
107. Id.
108. Id. art. 5.
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Articles 9 through 15, relating to the responsibilities of financial
institutions, are among the most important of the Model Regulations'
provisions. Article 9 defines "financial institutions."'1 9 Article 10 es-
tablishes a set of special provisions applicable to financial institutions.
One of the most important provisions is a requirement that financial
institutions may not keep anonymous accounts or accounts in ficti-
tious or incorrect names.110 Financial institutions must record and
verify identifying information about their clients.' Furthermore, fi-
nancial institutions must maintain the required records for at least five
years.1
2
Article 11 specifies that financial institutions must make informa-
tion available in response to requests by competent authorities. Fi-
nancial institutions, however, shall not share information with any
person other than the court or competent authority and must not no-
tify anyone (including the bank client in question) that authorities
have requested the information.113 This provision clearly aims to
maintain the secrecy of investigations so that bank clients will not
learn that they are under scrutiny. Article 11 also specifically provides
that "[t]he legal provisions referring to bank secrecy or confidentiality
shall not be an impediment to compliance with this Article, when the
information is requested by or shared with the court or other compe-
tent authority." 4 This provision eliminates any possibility of
problems arising during money laundering investigations in bank se-
crecy jurisdictions,"5 as the provision renders any bank secrecy laws
inoperative in the case of an official investigation. Article 19 contains
a similar blanket provision applicable to all the Model Regulations,
rendering existing bank secrecy rules inoperative. Article 12, as well
as article 11, emphasizes this provision in particular settings."
16
Article 12 requires that financial institutions shall record cash
transactions exceeding an amount specified by competent authority.
117
109. The Model Regulations define financial institutions as, "among others: ... a com-
mercial bank, trust company, savings and loan association, building and loan association,
savings bank, industrial bank, credit union, or other thrift institution or establishment au-
thorized to do business under the domestic banking laws, whether these be publicly or
privately owned, or mixed." Id. art. 9.
110. Id. art. 10.
111. Id.
112. Id
113. Id. art. 11.
114. Id.
115. See supra note 25.
116. Model Regulations arts. 11, 12, 19.
117. Id. art. 12.
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Transaction records will include information to assist authorities in lo-
cating the person who made the transaction. Financial institutions
shall treat multiple cash transactions exceeding the applicable speci-
fied amount "as a single transaction if they are undertaken by or on
behalf of any one person during any one day or any other period es-
tablished by competent authority. ' S If a person were to make five
cash deposits of $2,000 in a bank in Peru, for example, and Peru
adopts a reporting minimum of $10,000, the deposits would come
within the reporting requirements. The Model Regulations, however,
propose that reporting is only necessary when a financial institution,
its employees, officers, or agents have knowledge of these multiple
transactions; 119 the Model Regulations impose no affirmative duty to
find out whether multiple transactions have exceeded the specified
amount.
Financial institutions must report suspicious transactions under
article 13.120 Furthermore, financial institutions have a duty to "pay
special attention to all complex, unusual or large transactions, whether
completed or not, and to all unusual patterns of transactions, and to
insignificant but periodic transactions, which have no apparent eco-
nomic or lawful purpose."12'
Article 14 calls for "severe" sanctions for financial institutions,
their employees, staff, directors, owners, or other representatives who
violate money laundering laws.'1 These institutions are vicariously
liable for the acts of their employees, owners, and directors.' Willful
failure to comply with articles 10 and 13 will subject the institution
and its employees, owners, and directors to criminal liability.'" 4
Additionally, article 15 requires financial institutions to enact
complementary programs to ensure ethical conduct of employees and
their compliance with the Model Regulations.'1
D. Analysis of the Model Regulations and Suggested
Enhancements
The Model Regulations, limited by their adoption of the Vienna
Convention's definition of money laundering, are narrow in scope, ap-
118. Id-
119. Id.
120. Id. art. 13.
121. kI
122. Id. art. 14.
123. kI.
124. kI&
125. Ia art. 15.
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plying only to money laundering that facilitates drug trafficking. 126 A
more expansive definition of money laundering could provide broader
coverage, enabling the member states to use legislation based on the
Model Regulations to fight other forms of money laundering, such as
laundering that is related to loan sharking. Moreover, when banks
report suspicious transactions, they generally do not know in what il-
licit activities their customers are involved. 127 Banks will supply infor-
mation that will be useful in investigating crimes other than money
laundering, and it would be helpful to OAS countries to have the spe-
cial provisions, such as asset forfeiture, available to law enforcement
agencies and to the judiciary.
The drafters of the Model Regulations recognized the importance
of the Regulations as a tool for fighting various types of crime. The
drafters recommended that CICAD encourage OAS member states to
consider "[a]pplying the relevant provisions of the Regulations to
laundering connected with other serious offenses." 128 More expansive
coverage through national legislation would also follow the EC Direc-
tive's encouragement to EC member states to enlarge the definition of
"criminal activity" in European money laundering regulations so as to
include crimes not specifically mentioned in the Vienna
Convention.
129
It is essential to subject any institution that can be used for
money laundering to the same regulatory framework as traditional fi-
nancial institutions. Article 9, however, which provides the definition
of financial institution, does not specifically cover insurance agen-
cies.' 30 The insurance industry in the United States appears poised to
assist in money laundering,' 3' and this danger possibly is present in
other OAS countries. Through interpretation of section 2(c) of article
9, which covers "any other activity subject to supervision by govern-
ment bank or other financial institution authorities," the Model Regu-
lations' provisions for financial institutions may include insurance
126. See id. art. 1.
127. Money Laundering Experts Team Up-On and Off the Job, MAO. OF BANK
MGrr., Mar. 1991, at 21 (quoting Amy G. Rudnick, former director of the Office of Finan-
cial Enforcement at the leasury Department).
128. Model Regulations, Recommendations of the Group of Experts to CICAD.
129. See Council Directive, supra note 61.
130. See Model Regulations art. 9.
131. Money Laundering Experts Team Up-On and Off the Job, supra note 127 (quot-
ing Michael Zeldin, acting director of the Money Laundering office at the Department of
Justice).
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companies.132 The classification, however, of insurance companies as
financial institutions depends on the existing regulatory framework in
each OAS member state.
In light of public official involvement in money laundering in
Latin American countries, 3 perhaps the OAS or its member states
should consider special, more severe, penal, civil or administrative
sanctions for violations under article 2 by public officials who use their
office to commit an offense.13' Such enhanced penalties, aimed at re-
ducing government officials' involvement in illicit traffic, would serve
two purposes. First, it would help prevent the institutionalizing of
money laundering and drug trafficking. Second, enhanced penalties
for public officials would help ensure the integrity of national enforce-
ment mechanisms used to fight the drug trade by reducing the number
of corrupt officials who can exert pressure on such organizations for
protection.1
35
The Model Regulations also fail to address the transportation of
large sums of cash from one member state to another. Large transfers
of cash may involve suspicious transactions, but financial institutions
may fail to report the transfers because smurfs break down large
transfers into small deposits, circumventing the countries' reporting
systems, or because the transfers are made electronically. The Group
of Experts has suggested that CICAD study "the feasibility and con-
venience of requiring the recording and/or reporting of the transporta-
tion, from one member state to another, of large sums of cash in
excess of a specified amount." '136
A further limitation of the Model Regulations is that they con-
template information sharing only in response to a request from a
132. See Model Regulations art. 9, § 2(c).
133. Representative cases include the identification of 200 Peruvian military officars
accused of corruption and complicity in drug trafficking activities. Peruvian Political Crisis:
Summary of Events, April 18-20, NoTSuR-S. AM. AND CARIBBEANi POL. AIr ., Apr. 22,
1992, available in LEXIS, World Library, NotSur File. In January 1992 Colombia con-
victed 30 customs employees of money laundering. Colombian Customs Employces Con-
victed of Money Laundering, NonSuR-S. AM. AND CARMBEAN PoL AiT., Jan. S, 19?2,
available in LEXIS, World Library, NotSur File. Senior Panamanian government leadera
"have had strong ties to corrupt banks," which makes it unlikely that the government % ill
make a significant effort to halt money laundering. Stephen Labaton, Panama is Resisting
U.S. Pressure to Alter "Inadequate" Bank Laws, N.Y. TMms, Feb. 6, 1990, at Al.
134. Model Regulations, Recommendations of the Group of Experts to CICAD.
135. See Colliver, supra note 27, at 2 (explaining skepticism about the effectiveness of
new Venezuelan regulations criminalizing money laundering, because the Venezuelan judi-
ciary and politicians are so corrupt).
136. Model Regulations, Recommendations of the Group of Ex'perts to CICAD.
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member state. 37 The Group of Experts has pointed out that CICAD
should study the "feasibility and convenience of forwarding to other
member states information that might be useful in the investigation of
the offenses referred to in the Model Regulations, without the need
for a prior request."' 38 Through this recommended procedure, a
member state that has identified suspicious activity potentially involv-
ing another OAS member state could stimulate an investigation, with-
out the need for a bilateral agreement for the exchange of information
between the two OAS members in question.
Financial institutions will need incentives to ensure their compli-
ance with legislation based on the Model Regulations. The Model
Regulations require financial institutions to adopt and implement pol-
icies and controls to guard against money laundering offenses, as well
as to name a compliance officer at the management level who will act
as a liaison with the competent authorities. 39 To ensure the success of
such programs, additional financial incentives must be made available
to banks and bank employees at all levels who assist in providing in-
formation regarding suspicious activities. Programs could offer incen-
tives at two levels. First, member state governments could provide
some economic benefit, for instance a tax break, to financial institu-
tions that significantly comply with money laundering investigations.
Second, within individual financial institutions, management should
provide adequate incentives for employees to avoid providing assist-
ance to money launderers. While drug traffickers clearly have large
sums at their disposition to engage unethical employees' assistance,
financial institutions may be able to provide some economic incentive
for discovering illegal use of financial institutions, as well as reward
ethical behavior through promotions and employee recognition.
When considering additional laws to prevent money laundering,
it is essential to keep in mind that many OAS member states are de-
veloping countries. Developing countries must be able to attract for-
eign investment. Restrictive laws designed to thwart money
laundering will inhibit some investment, particularly that deriving
from illegal sources. 40 While such an effect may be desirable from
the United States perspective, it could be highly disruptive to the
economies of cash-poor countries. The United States should be will-
137. Model Regulations art. 11.
138. Model Regulations, Recommendations of the Group of Experts to CICAD.
139. Model Regulations art. 15.
140. See Labaton, supra note 133.
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ing to provide economic assistance to needy countries that aggres-
sively investigate and prosecute money laundering.
A more fundamental problem is that some of the legal concepts
included in the Model Regulations were borrowed from U.S. law and
are completely different from legal concepts used in some OAS mem-
ber states' legal systems. 14 1 Perhaps each OAS member, or preferably
the OAS itself, can develop regulations that further explain the appli-
cation of the legislation and give guidance to the courts.
The Model Regulations lack a provision for coordinating criminal
penalties for article 2 offenses. While such a provision for uniform
penal sanctions would require accommodating the various member
states' judicial systems, it would eliminate areas that remain attractive
to money launderers due to the light penal sanctions in effect in such
places. Furthermore, coordination would help to avoid conflicts that
may arise among member states and to avoid accusations that one
country's stiff criminal penalties actually encourage money launderers
to work in other states with lighter sanctions. Arguably, an easier so-
lution for an OAS country would be simply to enact harsher criminal
penalties of its own. A coordinated OAS set of sanctions, however,
would allow the member states to enact appropriate legislation
quickly and might prevent the need for constant changes in countries'
criminal laws.
The Model Regulations, if adopted by all OAS member states,
will merely establish a legal framework for limiting money laundering.
Unless extensive communication networks and technology sharing ar-
rangements are in place, the Model Regulations will be little more
than a paper tiger.142 Without sophisticated computer equipment, the
reporting system contemplated by the Model Regulations will become
bogged down in a slow, labor intensive, paper reporting system. Com-
puter assistance will be particularly important in tracking multiple
cash deposits made on the same day that exceed the mandatory re-
porting limit contained in the Model Regulations. An information
and intelligence center approved in May 1991 in Cartagena, Colom-
bia' 43 is a step in that direction. At the Cartagena meeting, represent-
141. See OAS Unit Proposes Money Laundering, Forfeiture Laws, supra note 5.
142. In June 1993, the United States and Argentina concluded the final arrangements
for opening a teleprocessing network for the two countries to exchange information on
drug trafficking. Argentina, Further Reports on President Menem's Visit to Washington,
BBC SulziARY OF Wonu BROADCASTS, July 2, 1993, available in LEXIS, World Library,
Allwld File.
143. Latin Nations Approve System to Track Drug Money, MotNEY LAU-NDErJr.G
ALERT, May 1991, at 7, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, MLA File.
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atives of thirty-three Latin American nations approved a plan to
create an intelligence center in Bolivia to track financial transactions
of drug barons and money launderers. 1" Continuous technical im-
provements are essential because better compliance by banks will re-
sult in money launderers seeking increasingly sophisticated and
diversified practices to defeat legal impediments to money
laundering. 45
V. CONCLUSION
Efforts by individual nations are ineffective in the war against
money laundering and drug trafficking. Countries that lack laws
criminalizing money laundering or that have stringent bank secrecy
laws will continue to attract illegally derived profits.
OAS member states should adopt the Model Regulations by en-
acting appropriate national legislation. The Model Regulations repre-
sent a vast improvement over the present system in the Western
Hemisphere, which consists primarily of the United States' extensive
anti-money laundering legislation, a few individual country efforts,
and a series of bilateral agreements. The prevailing piecemeal ap-
proach leaves many opportunities open to money launderers to struc-
ture their transactions so that they take advantage of safe banking
havens or loopholes in the existing statutory schemes.
Although the Model Regulations represent a step towards a uni-
form anti-money laundering scheme for the Western Hemisphere,
OAS member states should seek to make the Model Regulations even
more comprehensive. Coordination of criminal penalties in the mem-
ber states and adoption of a more expansive definition of money laun-
dering, such as that chosen by the European Community, would
eliminate some of the weaknesses of the Model Regulations. Further-
more, member states' legislatures should consider special programs to
provide bank employees and banks with incentives to report the suspi-
cious transactions. Moreover, the OAS must address the less devel-
oped member states' need for foreign investment, which may be
inhibited by stricter banking laws.
Finally, mandatory reporting of transactions above a certain dol-
lar amount will be expensive to administer and will give rise to smurf-
ing, a labor intensive way of defeating the reporting limits imposed by
144. Id.
145. See Money Laundering Experts Team Up-On and Off the Job, supra note 127
(quoting Amy G. Rudnick).
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governments. Smurfing is likely to become prevalent in Latin Ameri-
can countries that have poor populations and people eager to earn
money. Good technical support and computer programs can assist
governments in identifying suspicious transactions.
The Model Regulations create an opportunity for the Western
Hemisphere. OAS member states can now attempt to curb money
laundering through the enactment of uniform laws. Before public
opinion decries anti-drug trafficking legislation as ineffective, OAS
member states should try to make the banking system in the Western
Hemisphere as inhospitable as possible to money launderers.

